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What judges do and what judges say are not always consistent, but
those two activides-the act of decisionmaking and the act of
explaining the decision-are inextricably linked. In a now-famous
legal essay, Professor Robert Cover wrote that 'judges deal pain and
death."' Every decision they make imposes their will on other human
beings.2 When a judge sentences a defendant to prison, the judge's
decision takes away the defendant's liberty. When a judge finds
contractual liability, the decision forces one party to compensate the
other. Every word, then, masks a deed. And the deed, ultimately, is
one of power and coercion.'
Thus, like police officers, correctional officers, and even military
personnel, judges are, in some respects, agents of state coercion. But
judges are more than that. They do not simply execute the coercive
powers of others.' In many situations, judges actually create the very
* B.A., Yale University, 1987; M. Phil., Cambridge University, 1988;J.D., Vanderbilt School
of Law, 1992. I would like to thank Barry Friedman, Karen Eastman, Michael Barr, Dan
Abrahamson, Elaine Corey, and Amy Kwak for their ideas and reactions to this Article. I,
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1. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609 (1986).
2. See id. at 1601 (stating that judicial decision can have effect on someone's freedom,
property, children, or life).
3. See id. at 1608 (suggesting that one who is punished might need to be coerced and that
need for "just" punishment justifies coercion or violence).
4. Judges often interpret and enforce statutes passed by Congress and rules made by
administrative agencies. As opposed to common law decisions, decisions based on statutes or
administrative rules permit the judge latitude to rely on the coercive powers of others. Nonethe-
less, even these decisions often involve a significant amount ofjudicial interpretation. Ajudge
must still interpret an ambiguous statute and decide whether an agency decision is valid. See,
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coercion they impose.' Unlike police officers or military personnel,
judges generally lack the physical tools to carry out that coercion
themselves. Ajudge who imposes a prison term on a defendant must
rely on other officials, including wardens, correctional officers, and
probation officers, to enforce that term.
Here, then, is part of the relation between whatjudges do and what
judges say. Ajudicial opinion, the judge's voice, must legitimate the
judge's decision. In the words of Justices O'Connor, Souter, and
Kennedy, "The Court's power lies.., in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and
to declare what it demands."7 Not only must the judiciary persuade
other government actors to enforce its opinion; it must also make the
e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)
(holding that courts will uphold agency's statutory construction as long as it is not "arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute" if Congress has not directly addressed issue);
Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 138 (1979) (using congressional intent to interpret
Emergency School Aid Act); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951)
(reviewing agency findings under substantial evidence test based on "record as a whole"); see also
infra note 11 and accompanying text (describing manner in which judges rely on congressional
intent to legitimate decisions). Even when a court defers to an agency decision, the court is
essentially sanctioning that decision by allowing it to stand.
5. Judicially created common law, in fact, could be viewed as a whole framework of
coercion created and imposed byjudges. For an interesting discussion of how different forms
of language mask, confine, and explain violence, see Ellen W. Clayton &Jay Clayton, Afterword:
Voices and Violence-A Dialogue, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1807-18 (1990) (incorporating views of
various scholars into dialectic about violence in law, government, and people).
6. See Cover, supra note 1, at 1618-19 (discussing danger to judges caused by ineffective
domination of defendants by police, jailers, and other enforcers). This is not to say that judges
have no recourse to the other coercive powers of government. Historically, some judicial
decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), have been enforced
through the use of government force. The Brown decision sparked massive resistance across the
United States. Jack Patterson, They Liked Ike, Loved Lucy, and Listened to McCarthy, Bus. WL,June
7, 1993, at 14, 14 (book review). In Arkansas, Governor Faubus declared his intention to ignore
the decision and to maintain segregated schools. Id. He only complied with the Court's
mandate to desegregate when President Eisenhower sent the 101st Airborne Division to Little
Rock to force Central High School to open its doors to black students. Benjamin Fine, Troops
on Guard at Schoo4" Negroes Ready to Return, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1957, at 1. For two perspectives
on these events, see ELIZABETH HUcKABY, CRISIS AT CENTRAL HIGH (1980), which provides a
teacher's version of the events in Little Rock, and Raymond T. Diamond, Confrontation as
Rejoinder to Compromise: Reflections on the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis, 11 NAT'L BLAcK LJ. 151
(1989), which evaluates events in Little Rock in light of Brown and examines justifications for
the governor's resistance.
In most cases, however, and particularly in most civil cases, judicial decisions rarely require
such direct application of the executive branch's coercive power. Indeed, the judiciary would
be unable to maintain its independence at all if it had to rely on the military to enforce its
judgments. The fact remains, however, that to fulfill their function of resolving disputes,judges
must legitimize governmental coercion. They must do so in a way that is generally acceptable
to those upon whom they rely. Because judges do not have direct control over the most
formidable governmental coercive powers, they must instead employ rhetoric, logic, and other
tools of persuasion to impose their decisions.
7. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992).
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imposition of governmental violence acceptable on a general level
throughout the entire interpretive community, and, if possible,
throughout society as well. Thus, as Professor Cover recognized,
"Legal interpretation is . . . a practical activity . . . designed to
generate credible threats and actual deeds of violence . . . in an
effective way."9
Part of the process of legitimation, therefore, is persuasion."0 For
those who already agree with the result of a judicial decision, such
persuasion may be unnecessary. Likewise, some in the interpretive
community obey simply out of respect for the court and the court's
ability to administer violence; some citizens will always fear raw power.
Of course, these two groups do not represent the entire interpretive
community. Some who read ajudge's opinion will not have made up
their minds as to what result they prefer before reading it. Others,
perhaps lacking expertise in a particular area of law, may not have any
idea what to think before examining the opinion. Still others may be
willing to change their views. For these last three groups of readers,
the process of legitimation clearly must include some persuasion.
If one starts with the vision of legal texts as persuasive voices of
legitimacy for institutional violence, one quickly faces the question of
exactly how those texts fulfill their function. How do judges structure
their texts to confer legitimacy on their decisions? There may be any
number of answers to that question. For example, judges often base
decisions on the language of a statute or on the intent of Congress."
By so doing, they essentially rest the legitimacy of decisions on the will
of more majoritarian branches of the government, perhaps subcon-
sciously expecting this co-option of majoritarian legitimacy to speed
8. "Interpretive community" refers to those who read and study judicial opinions. This
audience comprises attorneys, legislators, executive officials, otherjudges, and, occasionally, the
general public and the media. It does not, however, usually include people whose working lives
are largely unconnected to governing or to practicing law. Baseball players, factory workers,
doctors, and engineers probably read fewjudicial opinions. This Article assumes, therefore, that
judges write most frequently for the interpretive community, not for the general public. With
some exceptions, judges use opinions to persuade the interpretive community. Thejudges, in
turn, rely on the interpretive community to persuade the general public.
9. Cover, supra note 1, at 1610.
10. For some insight into other mechanisms of projecting legitimacy, see STANLEYMILGRAM,
THE INDIVIDUAL IN A SOCIAL WORMD 102-37 (1977), which describes obedience-inducing
environmental factors present in most situations involving authority. See also HERBERT C.
KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENcE 77-135 (1989) (describing structures and
dynamics common to all types of authority).
11. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (stating that courts, in reviewing agency's statutory interpretation, must first determine
whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue"); Illinois Bell Tel. Co.
v. FCC, 966 F.2d 1478, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that words of any statute furnish "plainest
guide to congressional intent"); Tyler v. Pasqua, 748 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1984) (examining
"first the statutory language, then the legislative history").
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the acceptance of the judicial decision. This Article, however, focuses
on a different aspect of the quest for legitimacy: judicial use in
opinion writing of moral structures and moral reasoning as a means
of creating legitimacy.
Because law rests on a foundation of violence, as a persuasive tool
it ultimately must also engage a superstructure of morality.12 This
is not to say that law defines or limits personal moral choices in all
circumstances. Often, it does not. Nor do judges necessarily
impose their own notions of morality on the public through judicial
decisionmaking. In many circumstances, judges may feel constrained
by statutes, judicial precedent, and the structure of the law to such an
extent that their own moral views matter little.
In fact, moral theory may have very little to do with the act of
judicial decisionmaking. As Professor Stanley Fish points out,
"[W] henjudges do what they do, they do not do it in accordance with
or at the behest of some systematic and coherent account of law and
its relation to morality and society." 4 Fish argues, rather, that
judicial decisionmaking is an amorphous process in which judges rely
on experience and intuition to reach a result.
Even if Fish is right, this Article argues that theory, and particularly
moral theory, has everything to do with howjudges explain that result
to the rest of us. 6 And it is the explanation more than the act of
decisionmaking that confers legitimacy on the judicial system. As the
Supreme Court has noted, the judiciary must "take care to speak and
act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the
[judiciary] claims for them." 7 One would expect, then, that the
moral reasoning the judge adopts in an opinion would both shape
and confine the way the judge explains the decision. And, just as
12. The term "superstructure" is used in an architectural, not a Marxist, sense. For a full
discussion of the intrinsic relationship between legal authority and morality, see Heidi Hurd,
Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611, 1677 (1991), where the author states that "if the law
is to possess any authority at all it must be by virtue of accurately reflecting other obligations..
.which exist antecedent to the enactment and enforcement of the law." But seeJOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 23-109 (1986) (finding that no single universally applicable exercise of
legitimate authority exists for all people).
13. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-15 (1989) (holding that government may
not prohibit flag-burning and thus cannot compel respect for flag); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972) (holding that government may not distinguish between married and unmarried
person in personal choices regarding whether to bear or beget child); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (stating that government may not forbid certain types of education).
14. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 384 (1989).
15. Id. at 372-98.
16. See infra notes 78-120 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between moral
reasoning and judicial opinions).
17. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2814 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy &
Souter, JJ.).
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important, because the interpretive community may view some types
of moral reasoning as more persuasive than others, the type of moral
reasoning a judge uses may impede or accelerate the process of
legitimation.18
Part I of this Article briefly outlines different stages of moral
development and the type of moral reasoning that persons at each
stage most frequently employ. In so doing, the Article sketches both
Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development, based on a
longitudinal study of male morality, and Professor Carol Gilligan's
theory of moral development, based on a study of female morality.
In Part H, the Article examines DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services9 in an attempt to show how the type of
moral reasoning a judge adopts in writing an opinion shapes and
confines both the text of the opinion and the justifications the judge
presents for the decision.
Part I draws some startling lessons from the close reading of
DeShaney. First, the Article advances the theory that the relationship
between author and audience, that is, between the judge and the
legal community, may determine which systems of moral reasoning
more effectively confer legitimacy on a particular decision. Because
the audience for judicial opinions, the interpretive community, is
largely male and relies heavily on Kohlberg's fourth-stage moral
reasoning, this Article concludes that fourth-stage moral reasoning
may confer greater legitimacy on the act of judicial decisionmaking
than other types of moral reasoning. This conclusion, however, is
descriptive rather than normative. As the composition of the legal
community changes and as the community loses some of its homoge-
neity in terms of moral reasoning, one might expect other types of
moral reasoning to become increasingly effective tools in legitimating
judicial decisions.
Part III also attempts to test this description of the legitimating
effects of moral reasoning through an analysis of several landmark
decisions that still form the basis for much jurisprudential debate.
Although a close reading of only a few opinions hardly exhausts the
topic, this Article concludes that there is some support for the
proposition that the type of moral reasoning a judge employs plays a
role in shaping the text of a decision and in determining that
decision's ultimate jurisprudential legitimacy.
18. See infra notes 143-245 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between form
of moral reasoning used in legal opinions and interpretive community's acceptance of those
opinions).
19. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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I. THE STRUCTURES OF MORAL REASONING
A. Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development
In the 1950s, Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg"° began conducting a
longitudinal study of young males in which he followed their
development for a period of more than twenty years.2 Through this
research, Dr. Kohlberg developed a theory of moral development that
postulates six separate stages of moral reasoning.2 Most adults,
according to Kohlberg, operate in the third, fourth, and fifth stages;
only a few ever reach the sixth stage.2"
In Kohlberg's first stage of moral reasoning, which he terms
heteronomous morality, the individual acts primarily out of a desire
to escape punishment.24 What is right is determined by what action
will avoid personal pain.25 Significantly, the actor does not recognize
that others in society may have interests that differ from the actor's
interests or that create a different point of view. 6
The second stage of moral reasoning is a more pragmatic one. The
actor, while recognizing that others may have a different perspective
in any given situation, assumes that all individuals will act to maximize
their own satisfaction. 27 Moral legitimacy thus exists in the pursuit
of one's interests.28 Reciprocal exchange resting on the mutual
interests of two parties is seen as inherently just.' According to
Kohlberg, in this stage, it is "important to keep promises so that
others will keep their promises to you.""°
In the third stage, the individual begins to construct a system of
shared moral norms that incorporates numerous perspectives and
represents societal agreement about the way people should live.3
20. Lawrence Kohlberg served as professor of education and social psychology at Harvard
University from 1968 until his death in 1987. Dr. Kohlberg penned numerous books and
articles, the most significant of which discusses his theory on stages of moral development.
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA
OFJUSTICE (1981).
21. See 1 ANNE COLBY& ]LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF MORALJUDGENT 82
(1987) (discussing format and chronology of Kolhlberg's moral judgment interviews).
22. See id. at 77-117 (1987) (providing empirical data supporting theory of moral stages
originally described in ]LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHYOF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL
STAGES AND THE IDEA OFJUSTIcE (1981)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 18, 25.
27. Id. at 18, 26.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 18, 26-27.
30. Id. at 27.
31. Id. at 18, 27-28.
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The individual thus places significant emphasis on living up to societal
expectations and on following society's rules, not because those rules
and values have any independentjustification, but simply because they
seem to be imposed absolutes.32 As a societally imposed norm, the
Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,"
represents this stage of moral reasoning.3
Some scholars have termed Kohlberg's fourth stage the "law and
order" stage.' Here, the individual primarily identifies with the
need to preserve the whole sociomoral system: one obeys rules
because those rules are part of a social contract, right and wrong flow
from societal consensus, and majority will is the ultimate justification
for the imposition of new rules. 5 An individual operating with
stage-four reasoning would therefore expect strict adherence to the
Constitution and statutes not because those documents embody
preexisting universal ethical principles, but rather because they are
manifestations of a social contract based on majority will. 6 More-
over, legal precedent, which embodies one of society's accepted
historical methods of treating problems, becomes part of the
necessary social contract
3 7
Likewise, in this stage, private contractual agreements are important
only because of their usefulness in maintaining a smoothly function-
ing society.' Concerns about procedural justice and impartiality
often emerge as central considerations in morality.39 An individual
operating in stage-four morality, therefore, might claim that
"[e]xceptions to the law cannot be given. This would lead to totally
subjective decisions on the part of the law enforcers. "'
In stage five, the individual identifies universal values and human
rights that exist prior to the organization of society.4" The legitimacy
of a social order, then, is judged by the degree to which that social
order protects these preexisting values.4 2 Under stage-five reasoning,
32. Id. at 18, 27.
33. Id.
34. Eg., Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progreisives or Reactionaries: The Law and
Order Cognitive Orientation of Lauters, 7 LAW & PSY cHOL. REV. 39, 40 n.2 (1982) (describing
Kohlberg's fourth stage of moral development as being focused on authority, rules, and social
order).
35. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 18, 28-29.
36. COLBY & KOHILBERG, supra note 21, at 18, 28.
37. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 28.
38. See COLBY & KOHLB-RG, supra note 21, at 18, 28 (describing stage-four perspective as
subordinating individuals to system as whole).
39. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 18, 28-29.
40. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 29.
41. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 19, 29-30.
42. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 29.
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law should change in a utilitarian way to protect fundamental
rights.43 The recognition that some rights exist prior to the organi-
zation of society also leads to both an obligation to uphold these
rights and a concern for the protection of minorities.' Consequent-
ly, preexisting fundamental rights must form the basis for any social
contract, even if those rights conflict with the will of the majority.'
Although in this stage procedural due process continues to be
important as a guarantor of fairness, the individual recognizes the
need for judicial discretion in some circumstances.'
Rather than change the stage-five perspective of a moral being,
stage six makes that perspective more conscious and universal.47 At
stage six, stage-five values become deliberate principles, or "universal
ethical principles," that the actor can apply to any situation.' These
principles are based less on the social contract and more on notions
of trust and community that must precede any legitimate social
contract and must flow from a fundamental respect for the humanity
of others.49 Thus, a stage-six actor might recognize the need to
incarcerate a criminal to protect potential victims, but that actor
might also want to preserve the dignity of the offender."0 Likewise,
stage-six actors often advocate the distribution of societal resources in
accordance with need rather than talent or achievement, viewing
accomplishment or talent as primarily the product of genetics or
differential opportunity rather than the result of any specific intrinsic
merit.-"
B. A "Different Voice": Gilligan's Theory of Feminine Moral Development
Although Kohlberg viewed his stages as a universal linear process
of human development, not all psychologists share his views.52 Some
43. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 19, 29-30.
44. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 19, 29.
45. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 29.
46. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 30. Kohlberg notes that individuals engaging in
stage-five reasoning permit judicial discretion in order to effect social change. Id. at 30.
47. See COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 19, 31 (explaining universal ethical principles
of justice, including equality of human rights and respect for dignity of human beings as
individuals).
48. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 19.
49. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 19, 31-32.
50. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 32.
51. COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 31.
52. See, e.g.,JAMES R. REST, DEVELOPMENT INJUDGING MORAL ISSUES 143-45 (1979) (finding
evidence of age trends insufficient to validate Kohlberg model); John it Snarey, Cross-Cultural
Universality of Social-Moral Development: A Critical View of Kohlbergian Research, 97 PSYCHOL BULL.
202, 218 (1985) (identifying biases in Kohlberg's theory that favor, inter alia, urban and middle-
class society). Norma Haan and others have noted that subjects from Western industrialized
societies placed higher on Kohlberg's scale than did subjects from other backgrounds. See
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have attacked the hierarchy that Kohlberg has erected, objecting in
particular to those values that Kohlberg posits as stage-six beliefs. 3
Other psychologists have criticized Kohlberg's theory for failing to
explain the moral development of women. In her book In a Different
Voice, Professor Carol Gilligan constructs an alternative theory that she
claims more accurately reflects feminine moral development.
5 4
According to Gilligan, women approach moral problems with a
distinct language that centers around the obligation to care for and
the desire to avoid hurting others.55 According to Gilligan, the
feminine resolution of moral dilemmas has less to do with "abstract
moral conception than with the collision between two lives."56 As
Gilligan states:
The moral imperative that emerges [for women] . . . is an
injunction to care, a responsibility to discern and alleviate the "real
and recognizable trouble" of this world. For men, the moral
imperative appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights of
others and thus to protect from interference the rights to life and
self-ftflfillment.57
Like Kohlberg, Gilligan posits different stages of moral develop-
ment.5 Under Gilligan's thesis, however, Kohlberg's abstract rights
NORMA HAAN ET AL., ON MORAL GROUNDS: THE SEARCH FOR PRACIMCAL MORALITY 59 (1985).
Haan also maintains that Kohlberg's individualistic vision of the developmental process ignores
the contextual and interactional ways in which people actually learn to make moral choices. See
id. at 38-41, 52-60 (focusing on interdependence of people as basis of morality).
53. E.g., CAROL GILUGAN, INADFFERENTVOICE 102-05 (1982) (questioningvalidityofstage-
six morality by critiquing Kohlberg's selection of Gandhi as exemplification of stage six).
Indeed, Kohlberg and Colby acknowledge that "[t]he exact nature and definition of stage-six
values are uncertain." COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 21, at 32. Interestingly, Kohlberg and
Colby have had difficulty empirically verifying stage-six values in non-Western cultures. See
Snarey, supra note 52, at 207 (explaining that difficulty in addressing non-Western cultures is
due to sampling and statistical problems). In the 1970s, however, Kohlberg proposed the
development of a seventh stage bordering on religious enlightenment that he hypothesized
would exist among elderly people. See KOHLBERG, supra note 22, at 355.
54. GILUGAN, supra note 53, at 1-2. Carol Gilligan is a Professor of Sociology and
Psychology at Harvard University. This moral reasoning does not occur exclusively in women.
Commentators recognize that men may use Gilligan's moral reasoning and that women may
engage in Kohlberg's moral reasoning. Peter D. Lifton, Individual Differences in Moral
Develoment: The Relation of Sex, Gender, and Personality to Morality, 53J. PERSONALriY 806, 308
(1985). Along these lines, it is important to remember that sex and gender differ. Sex refers
to the biological designation of an organism as male or female, while gender reflects the
sociological constructs of male and female. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 14
(1988). Thus, gender concepts are created and imposed by society. See id. According to
Elizabeth Spelman, gender is not a bipolar choice between masculine and feminine; "rather,
gender is complex, variegated, and multiple." Joseph W. Singer, Should Lanfters Care About
Philasophy?, 1989 DUKE U.J. 1752, 1770 (reviewing ELizABErH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN
(1988)).
55. GiLnGAN, supra note 53, at 30-31.
56. GILUGAN, supra note 53, at 101.
57. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 100.
58. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 73-105.
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and principles never adequately capture the organizing concepts of
connection and care, concepts that Gilligan believes form the basis for
women's moral development. 9 Gilligan believes that many women
go through three separate stages of moral development in which they
learn to view moral problems as conflicts between their own needs
and responsibilities and those of others.' How a woman views the
connections between actors in any moral dilemma assumes great
significance in determining which stage of moral reasoning she
employs.61
In the first stage, the actor focuses almost exclusively on caring for
herself.62 Questions of morality emerge only if the actor's own
needs conflict. 63  Consequently, one woman in this stage told
Gilligan that she viewed an unplanned pregnancy as both a perfect
"'chance to get married and move away from home'" and a restriction
on her ability "'to do a lot of things."'6'
Women in Gilligan's second stage of morality recognize a connec-
tion between self and others, and they articulate that link by
describing concepts of selfishness and responsibility.' At this point,
moral judgment relies on shared norms and expectations; moral good
equates with caring for others, especially the dependent and less
fortunate members of society.' The problem with the second stage,
however, is that the actor's devotion to others triggers conventional,
and often uncomfortable, roles of self-sacrifice.67 Because the actor
identifies goodness with self-sacrifice, she characterizes personal needs
and desires as selfish.' This denial of one's personal needs, accord-
ing to Gilligan, ultimately creates conflict within the actor herself and
59. GILLIGAN, supra note 58, at 73.
60. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 73-74.
61. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 74. Like Kohlberg, Gilligan's theory has been criticized for
its insensitivity to race and class distinctions. See LindaJ. Nicholson, Women, Morality, and Histoy,
50 Soc. RES. 514, 530-33 (1983) (noting that ideal of femininity has had greater influence on
white, middle-class women than on black, poor, and non-Western women). Moreover, Professor
Catharine MacKinnon has suggested that Gilligan's voice is the voice of women as victims. Se
Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 837 (1990) (describing
MacKinnon's view that female caring is result of patriarchy); Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of
Domination and the Nature of Women, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 352, 379 (1988) (reviewing CATHERINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFMIED (1987)) (discussing MacKinnon's belief that women's
caring quality is product of subordination to men). This criticism raises questions both as to the
uniqueness and the permanence of the process Gilligan describes.
62. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 74-79.
63. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 75.
64. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 75 (quoting 18-year-old woman who participated in Gilligan's
study).
65. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 74, 79, 82.
66. GILLIGAN, supra note 58, at 74, 79.
67. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 74, 80-82.
68. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 79-81.
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forces her to reevaluate the moral framework in which she oper-
ates.' Such an evaluation leads to Gilligan's third stage of moral
development.
7
In the third stage, the woman rejects the logic of pure self-sacrifice
and begins to include her own needs within the concept of care.
According to Gilligan, "Care becomes the self-chosen principle...
that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and
response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation
and hurt."7 2 A woman in this stage asks not only how she can avoid
hurting others but also how she can avoid hurting herself. 3
Gilligan and Kohlberg thus posit very different models of moral
reasoning. 4  The point of this Article, however, is not to assess
whether one model is more valid than the other.7 5 Rather, this
Article searches for evidence that the moral structures that Kohlberg
and Gilligan describe shape and confine reasoning in judicial
opinions.v If judges use particular types of moral reasoning in their
opinions, and if those types of reasoning mirror the current moral
stages of development of individuals within the interpretive communi-
ty and in society as a whole, then the moral reasoning ajudge subcon-
sciously chooses to explain a decision may in fact help legitimize that
decision.
7 7
69. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 74, 80-82.
70. GLIGAN, supra note 53, at 74, 82.
71. GILuGAN, supra note 53, at 74, 82.
72. GiLLIGAN, supra note 53, at 74.
73. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 82-103.
74. Both Kohlberg and Gilligan owe part of the philosophical foundations of their work to
Jean Piaget, the eminent child psychologist. Piaget first recognized that children's concepts of
justice progress through various stages as the child matures. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORALJUDGMENT
OF THE CHILD 315-17 (1965). He posited that moral development was related to the process of
socialization. Id. at 198. Thus, he claimed that children developed ideas of justice largely
through interaction with other children. Id.
75. Kohlberg rejected Gilligan's work, suggesting that both men and women use the same
types of moral reasoning. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 338-
70 (1984). Gilligan's work clearly rejects Kohlberg's contention that his model of development
is universal. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (criticizing Kohlberg for inaccurately
depicting women's moral development and providing alternative theory).
76. See infra notes 93-120 and accompanying text (contrasting majority and dissenting
opinions' use of moral structure in DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989)); infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. Supreme Court's use of
Kohlberg's fourth-stage moral reasoning in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); infra notes 172-
88 and accompanying text (discussing Kohlbergian analysis in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992)).
77. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussingjudges' use of moral reasoning
to legitimize their decisions).
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II. MORAL REASONING AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS
The legal reasoning injudicial opinions almost invariably makes use
of moral reasoning. No judge can escape the fabric of moral
structure in which he or she, perhaps even subconsciously, couches
the act of legal decisionmaking. That fabric often holds together an
opinion. When a judge chooses to speak, he or she does so within
the confines of this moral development. As a result, the moral
language a judge uses may shape, and ultimately limit, the explana-
tion given for any particular decision.
An examination of DeShaney v. Winnebago Department of Social
Services78 provides a good illustration of how moral reasoning shapes
explanations of judicial decisionmaking. In 1982, when Joshua
DeShaney was three years old, the Winnebago County Department of
Social Services (DSS) began to receive reports that he was the subject
of severe child abuse.79 The following year, after Joshua was admit-
ted to a local hospital with bruises and abrasions, DSS took Joshua
into protective custody for three days, after which they returned the
boy to his father.8" During the next six months, DSS continued to
find evidence that Joshua was being abused.8 Several hospitals
reported treating Joshua for suspicious injuries.82 On other occa-
sions, a DSS caseworker visiting Joshua's home noted unusual
injuries.83 The caseworker later testified that she "knew the phone
would ring some day and Joshua would be dead."84
Despite these repeated warnings, the state failed to act to protect
Joshua.' In March 1984, Joshua's father beat the boy so severely
that Joshua sustained permanent brain damage, which left him
profoundly retarded." Joshua and his mother sued the county
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,7 claiming that DSS had violated Joshua's
due process right to liberty by failing to intervene to prevent the
abuse.' The U.S. Supreme Court emphatically rejected these
claims. 89 The Court concluded that the state had no affirmative
78. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
79. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192 (1989).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 192-93.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 193.
86. Id.
87. Section 1983 provides for civil actions against state actors who deprive individuals of
their civil rights.
88. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
89. Id. at 198-203.
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obligation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to protect its citizens unless the state itself had so constrained
the individual as to render that person unable to care for himself or
herself.' If anyone had deprived Joshua of liberty, the majority
reasoned, it was his father."
What is clearly missing from the majority opinion is any semblance
of Carol Gilligan's feminine moral reasoning. The majority ignored
Gilligan's "injunction to care" and her "responsibility to discern and
alleviate the 'real and recognizable' trouble of the world."92 Despite
DSS' mission of protecting children from abuse, and despite the
repeated warnings DSS had received, the majority saw no connection
between DSS and Joshua.'- According to the majority, "The most
that can be said of the state functionaries... is that they stood by
and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active
role for them."94 In fact, the majority dismissed the state's action in
taking custody of Joshua as a temporary and therefore irrelevant
relationship. 95  The fact that the state returned Joshua to danger
created no causal connection between DSS and Joshua and thus no
responsibility on the state's part.9" The majority reasoned that DSS
merely "placed Uoshua] in no worse position than that in which he
90. Id. at 199-201. In other cases as well, the Court has taken the position that the state has
no duties unless it erects affirmative obstacles to a person's liberty. See, e.g., Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507-09 (1989) (holding that state may prohibit public
employees at state hospitals from performing abortions because state has no affirmative duty to
maintain hospitals); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (holding that state has no
obligation to fund medically necessary abortions for poor women).
91. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. As one commentator has pointed out, by placing the
responsibility for Joshua's well-being solely with his father, the majority takes a position
inconsistent with the Court's reasoning in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990). Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 58-62 (1992). In
Cruzan, the parents of an adult woman in a persistent vegetative state sought court approval to
remove her from life support systems. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265-66. The Court upheld a Missouri
statute that required Cruzan's parents to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence Cruzan's
prior intent to have her life support discontinued. Id. at 282-83. As Rutherford notes, such a
high standard essentially provides the state with veto power over the parents' decision.
Rutherford, supra, at 58. Thus, the Court "snatched decisionmaking power away from loving
parents in Cruzan." Id. at 62. In DeShaney, however, the Court refused to interpose the state
between Joshua and his father. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-201. Thus, it vested the power to
decideJoshua's fate in the hands of a brutal parent Id. at 201.
For an interesting discussion of the interaction between language, law, and domestic violence,
including an analysis of DeShaney, see Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change:
Law, Language, and Family Vwoence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1665-87 (1990).
92. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 100.
93. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02 (disavowing state responsibility to protect Joshua
actively); supra notes 90-91 (elaborating on majority's view of relation between DSS andJoshua).
94. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
95. See id. at 201 (finding that DSS' temporary custody of Joshua did not make state
"permanent guarantor" ofJoshua's safety).
96. Id.
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would have been had it not acted at all."97
The majority could not even begin, therefore, to ask whether DSS
could have used its relationship to prevent the harm to Joshua
because it did not recognize that any relationship existed. In fact, the
majority expressed the dilemma in DeShaney in utterly abstract terms.
It cautioned against "yielding to that impulse" of natural sympathy in
this case.98 Instead, the majority immediately depersonalized the
situation, referring to Joshua in the opening paragraphs as "petition-
er."99 It then approached the decision as if it were answering the
purely abstract question of whether the Due Process Clause imposes
an affirmative duty on the state to protect some citizens from
harm.1°° It discerned the answer to that question not from the
relationship between the parties in the case nor from any sense of
state responsibility but rather from abstract principles, like the intent
of the framers and the limits of prior precedent. 1'
The dissent, on the other hand, recognized the causal connection
between DSS andJoshua, focusing on the actions Wisconsin took with
respect to the child. 2 It noted that the state, by establishing a
monopolistic system of dealing with child abuse, a system that
funnelled all complaints and warnings through DSS, essentially
created a relationship between itself and Joshua.103  Because that
relationship may have preempted the formation of other protective
relationships, the dissent concluded that Wisconsin's relationship with
Joshua created responsibility for the state.104
In a demonstration of reasoning reminiscent of Gilligan's third
stage, the dissent accepted the fact that the state may also need to
protect itself and should not face liability for mere errors in profes-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 203.
99. Id. at 191.
100. See id. at 194-97 (discussing cases interpreting relationship between government and
citizens under Due Process Clause).
101. See id. at 195-97 (finding nothing in language, history, or case law of Due Process Clause
to support petitioner's claim).
102. See id. at 205,208-10,212 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (beginning analysis with positive state
actions rather than state's omissions, and finding that state law preempted other forms of aid
from reachingJoshua). BothJustice Brennan andJustice Blackmun wrote dissents in DeShaney.
BecauseJustice Blackmun both signedJustice Brennan's dissent and structured his own dissent
to read as an addendum to Justice Brennan's, this Article treats the two opinions as one dissent.
Like the dissent, some academics have recognized that empathy and caring have a place in
legal decisionmaking. SeeJudith Areen, A Need for Caring 86 MICH. L. REv. 1067, 1078-82 (1988)
(reviewing AIDS AND THE LAW (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987)) (transposing care
perspective on AIDS crisis and suggesting that government could facilitate caring about AIDS);
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L REv. 1574, 1593-1649 (1987) (providing
examples of empathic analyses in case law).
103. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 209-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 212.
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sional judgment.1"5 The dissent balanced this self-interest, however,
against Joshua's need for protection and concluded that, at a
minimum, the state had a responsibility to avoid arbitrary indifference
in its attempt to protect Joshua."° Moreover, this decision occurred
in a context clearly shaped by the "real world" facts of the situation.
"Poor Joshua!" °7 Justice Blackmun wrote at one point, describing
him as the "[v lictim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying,
cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by [the DSS] .
..108 In thus couching his decision to recognize state responsibili-
ty in personal rather than abstract terms, Justice Blackmun noted that
"compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging." "
The dissent, unlike the majority, was capable of exploring the
relationship between Joshua and DSS because it had a moral
framework for recognizing, explaining, and legitimizing that relation-
ship. The majority had no such framework. Thus, it had no tools
with which it could confer legitimacy on Joshua's claims. But while
the majority ignored Gilligan's moral reasoning and the concepts of
care and connection that form its foundation, it did not operate
outside the fabric of moral reasoning as a whole. Instead, it ap-
proached the dilemma with a classical Kohlberg moral analysis. It is
this Kohlbergian approach that helped legitimize the majority's
decision not to impose liability on the state.
In fact, the moral tools the majority used are undeniably mascu-
line-the majority couched its analysis in terms of abstract rights and
values."' Like individuals in Kohlberg's fourth stage of moral
105. Id. at 211.
106. Id. at 211-12. In another context, Gilligan observed that her research suggested two
ways of understanding the concept of responsibility. The first way, traditionally masculine, is to
define responsibility as personal commitment or contractual obligation. Ellen C. Dubois et al.,
Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Lau-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 11, 44 (1985). The
second, more feminine, concept of responsibility requires an actor to "tak[e] the initiative to
respond to [the] perception of [her] own" need and the needs of others. Id.
107. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing majority's impersonal and
abstract analysis in DeShaney). Aviam Soifer calls the majority approach described here
.machismo conceptualism." Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of
DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (1989). Professor Soifer criticizes the decision as
.a terrible example of the fiamiliar judicial quest for safe-houses designed by drawing rigid lines.
Judges strive for some mythical locus of certainty where they, at least, can escape the more
complicated relationships of common humanity." Id. That criticism could be leveled not just
at the majority opinion but at the entire structure of fourth-stage moral reasoning, which
emphasizes unbending rules emanating from social contracts. See supra notes 34-40 and
accompanying text (discussing rule-oriented nature of Kohlberg's fourth stage).
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reasoning, 1 ' the majority recognized due process as a necessary
ingredient of fairness, but it viewed due process and fairness as values
flowing not from universal, presocietal principles, but rather from
shared social values or norms." The tools the majority used to
legitimize this view of due process are all tools designed only to link
the notions ofjustice to these shared social values. Thus, the majority
argued that the language of the Constitution, the original
majoritarian social contract and the source of shared values, cannot
support liability for the state.113  It also suggested that the Framers,
in striking the original deal by which American society organized
itself, intended only "to protect the people from the State, not to
ensure that the State protected them from each other."" 4 Finally,
it argued that precedent, something akin to past performance on a
social contract, created an affirmative duty for the state only in very
limited circumstances.115
Just as significant, and perhaps more reminiscent of Kohlberg's
fourth stage of moral reasoning, the majority conceived of due
process as a fundamentally static concept."6 It viewed its role as
one of upholding and enforcing existing law; the Court was unwilling
to "thrust [change] upon [society] by [the] Court's expansion of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.""" In its
opinion, it sought only an interpretation of the Due Process Clause
that was consistent with its previous interpretations." 8 The majority
111. See supra notes 3440 and accompanying text (discussing Kohlberg's fourth stage of
moral reasoning).
112. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-200 (grounding argument for absence of state
responsibility forJoshua in widely accepted constitutional principles rather than higher values).
113. Id. As Professor Soifer points out, the strict textualist reading of the Due Process Clause
that DeShaney adopts would, if applied in all circumstances, undermine the Court's process of
selectively incorporating the Bill of Rights under the Clause and applying those rights against
the states. Soifer, supra note 110, at 1518 n.17. That process has been going on for most of this
century. Id.
114. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
115. See id. at 196-97, 198-99 (finding affirmative state action required only in cases where
individuals are in state custody).
116. See id. at 202.03 (transferring responsibility for expansion of state's duties under Due
Process Clause to state legislatures).
117. Id. at 203.
118. Id. at 198-200. The majority's effort, however, does not necessarily mean that it
achieved such consistency. In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984), for example, Justice
Rehnquist argued that "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody." This
reasoning appears to conflict with DeShaney. Perhaps more significant, several scholars have
argued that DeShaney's negative rights view of the Due Process Clause, a view that posits that the
state has no affirmative duty to its citizens but simply must not infringe on their liberties, is
inconsistent with the history and purpose of the Clause. See, e.g., MichaelJ. Gerhardt, The Rippe
Effects of Slaughter-House, 43 VAND. L. REV. 407, 414-37 (1990) (stating that Supreme Court has
improperly narrowed Fourteenth Amendment due process to scope of Fifth Amendment due
process); Soifer, supra note 110, at 1521-26 (arguing that post-Civil War Amendments mandated
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thus analyzed a significant number of the Court's opinions to
demonstrate that the prior case law did not create any due process
duty for the state in DeShaney.19  According to the majority, those
cases "stand only for the proposition that when the State takes a
person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety."12° The answer to Joshua's tragic
situation thus lay in a normative principle distilled from prior cases;
no exception forJoshua exists, no matter how tragic his case may be.
Like an individual in Kohlberg's fourth stage of moral reasoning, the
majority sought maintenance of the current social system not because
it was right or just, but simply because it already existed. Its opinion
did not recognize the potential to revise law for the benefit of society.
III. LESSONS FROM THE DESHANEY ANALYSIS
A. The Shaping ofJudicial Opinions and the Interpretive Community
The preceding Section's analysis of the DeShaney opinion illustrated
how moral reasoning both informs and confines the way judges seek
to legitimize their decisions. Because the DeShaney majority chose to
express itself with moral reasoning analogous to Kohlberg's fourth
stage, it necessarily placed greater emphasis on the use of judicial
tools that would uncover and give effect to a static and abstract
concept of shared social values.1 ' It used the intent of the Framers,
unchanging constitutional language, and precedent to create a vision
of a shared social norm of due process that could be applied simply
to the facts before it. 22 But just as this framework of moral reason-
ing provided the majority with one vision of the DeShaney problem, it
also deprived them of an alternative vision. Gilligan's values of care
and connection never entered into the majority's explanation of its
decision.12 Nor did the majority question the allegedly shared
federal intervention to prevent inaction by states that could deprive individuals of rights and
privileges guaranteed by Constitution and law).
119. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-97, 198-201.
120. Id. at 199-200.
121. See id. at 195 (explaining importance of Due Process Clause in Court's analysis).
122. See id. (noting that history does not support expansive reading of Constitution).
123. The majority ofjudicial opinions probably resort to only one type of moral reasoning
because the opinion's author begins to think about the decision in a certain way. This Article,
however, does not argue that different types of moral reasoning can never appear in the same
opinion. At least at the appellate level, opinions quite frequently represent the voice of more
than one judge. It is quite possible that different judges could desire the same result but view
the decision through different lenses of moral reasoning. It is also possible that they could
simply negotiate one opinion rather than write separate concurrences. The process of drafting
opinions through judicial coalition could result, therefore, in an opinion that employed various
19931
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social norm of due process that it decided to enforce; it never asked
whether that social norm adequately addressed the relationship
between the government and its citizens."
On some level, it is not surprising that the DeShaney majority
opinion employed Kohlberg's fourth stage of moral reasoning.
Because law, like so many other aspects of social organization, has
been created, perpetuated, and dominated by males over the last
several hundred years, one would expect the legal tools that have
evolved to be more masculine than feminine." Centuries of
development have woven a legal wholecloth from the fabric of
abstract rights and principles. Masculine moral concepts of individual
rights and social contracts, rather than feminine concepts of care and
connection, are indeed the fibers of that fabric.126 Even today, most
lawyers, judges, and legislators are male. 27 Furthermore, many
types of moral reasoning. For an analogous argument about the use of plain meaning in
statutory interpretation, see Frederick Schauer, Statutoy Construction and the CordinatingFunction
of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. Cr. REV. 231, 231-32, which postulates that the Supreme Court is
increasingly turning to plain meaning in statutory interpretation.
124. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-97 (performing mechanical due process analysis and
concluding that Due Process Clause does not impose duty on state to protect individual against
private violence).
125. Prior to this century, the law did not treat women and men equally. See, e.g., Milliken
v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 377 (1878) (struggling with question of whether married woman had
capacity to enter into contract); Bangs v. Inhabitants of Brewster, 111 Mass. 382, 385 (1873)
(discussing fact that domicile of married woman was determined by domicile of her husband).
This Article does not imply, however, that the law treats men and women equally at present.
See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981) (upholding statute requiring men but
not women to register for draft); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (upholding
Alabama prison regulation preventing women from serving as prison guards in maximum
security male prisons). Professor Catharine MacKinnon has asserted that some concepts of
equality perpetuate a male standard and thus are not the appropriate goal for women to seek.
See CATHmNE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 22-23 (1987) (arguing that instead ofseeking
same treatment for women as for men, feminists should attempt to end male domination over
women).
126. See Dubois et al., supra note 106, at 46 (discussing predominance of masculine analysis
injurisprudence). In the Dubois article, Professors Carol Gilligan and Carrie Menkel-Meadow
discuss some of the possible foundations of a system ofjurisprudence built on Gilligan's moral
reasoning. Id. at 36-60. They conclude that such a system might be more likely to facilitate
contextual decisionmaking. Id. at 51. It might also be more attuned to compromise than to
forcing polar (win/loss) choices. Alternatively, it might create entirely new solutions through
nonadversarial dialogue between parties and by allowing the parties to understand and satisfy
each other's needs. Id. at 51-54; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's LatryeringProcess, 1 BERKELEYWOMEN'S LJ. 39,50-51 (1985) (discussing
advantages to creating alternative jurisprudential system). Menkel-Meadow argues that the
adversarial system, based on "hierarchy, competition, and binary results," is essentially masculine.
Id.; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics. Perspectivesfrom the Women's
Movement; 61 N.Y.U. L REv. 589, 618-22 (1986) (discussing concept of"interdependent rights,"
which, based on Gilligan's moral reasoning, incorporates both male and female concerns about
rights and responsibilities).
127. A 1991 survey of 14,000 lawyers in California found that 93% of all attorneys in practice
for more than 20 years were white males, but only 49% of those in practice less than five years
were white males. Philip Hager, Minority Mix Expanding in Legal Profesion, LA. TIMES, Sept. 14,
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scholars argue that legal education remains steeped in the male dia-
logue.1
28
Moreover, fourth-stage moral reasoning may better serve to
legitimize the coercive power of the law than would other stages of
Kohlberg's moral reasoning. After all, fourth-stage moral reasoning
places significant emphasis on the maintenance of social order
because that order constitutes the will of the majority, not because it
reflects any inherentlyjust universal ethical principles that may or may
not be accepted by the general population.1" And those that create
the law clearly have a vested interest in maintaining the social order
that it projects.
But even on a less philosophical level, fourth-stage moral reasoning
may simply be a more effective tool of persuasion than other types of
moral reasoning at this time in the legal community. When a judge
writes an opinion, she usually speaks to a fairly select audience.
30
Although a few opinions seem aimed at the public at large,131 most
opinions are directed primarily toward the legal community, which
must interpret them. The judge thus writes not for the average
person but for other judges, legislators, and lawyers who will argue
future cases. This audience, it seems, overwhelmingly employs fourth-
1991, at A21; see also Prject: Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study
of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1988) (stating that 41% of
law students, but only 16% of practicing attorneys, were women).
128. See Paul T. Wangerin, Objectivisti4, Multiplistic, and Relative Truth in Developmental
Psychology and LegalEducation, 62 TtuL L. REv. 1237, 1282 n.171, 1296-98 (1988) (discussing male
philosophical foundations of traditional legal education); KC. Worden, Overshooting the Target:
A Feminist Deconstruction of LegalEducation, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1985) (discussing how
legal education demands that women engage in masculine structures of thought and behavior).
Kohlbergian notions of morality based on the freedom from interference by others and other
abstract rights and principles fit comfortably into the male dialogue.
129. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing fourth stage's focus on shared
values and norms rather than on inherently just principles).
130. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining that judges write opinions with
"interpretive community" in mind).
131. There are times when law does not keep pace with changing social values. Interestingly,
in such circumstances, a dissenting opinion may adopt a position accepted by society (or widely
advocated by some segments of society) but notyet accepted in the legal community. Dissenting
opinions, then, may be more frequently directed toward the public at large than are majority
opinions. When the audience changes, so should notions of persuasiveness. Judges may realize
intuitively that the general public is not as persuaded by stage-four morality as is the interpretive
community. If they do, one would expect the spectrum of dissenting opinions to show wider
variation in moral reasoning than would the spectrum of majority opinions. See e.g., Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 422 (1989) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (describing uniqueness of flag
and evoking emotion through quotation of patriotic poetry); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (praising action by former capital of
confederacy to alleviate racial discrimination). Both exemplify dissents which are addressed to
the general pubic and which seem to have abandoned fourth-stage moral reasoning.
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stage Kohlberg moral reasoning in its approach to the law.132 One
recent study found that ninety percent of a random sampling of
attorneys operated with stage-four morality.1 13 Although many male
adults in the general population also employ stage-four reasoning, the
study found that the concentration at stage four in the general
population was not nearly as strong as it was in the legal communi-
ty." In fact, as many as thirty-five percent of adults seemed to
employ stage-five or stage-six moral reasoning.3 5 Another fifteen or
twenty-five percent seemed to employ stage-two or stage-three moral
reasoning.13
6
Whether attorneys employ stage-four moral reasoning because of
their education or whether the law attracts individuals who already
exhibit stage-four moral reasoning is a question beyond the scope of
this Article. The point, however, remains clear: attorneys, as a
community, exhibit unusual degrees of stage-four moral reason-
ing.137 As a result, one would expect judicial opinions that employ
this level of reasoning to be more persuasive among attorneys than
opinions that use another type of moral reasoning.
The suggestion that stage four is more persuasive in the interpretive
community than are other types of moral reasoning, however, does
not lead to a normative view of law. It merely describes the current
status of the process of legitimation and the effects of moral reason-
ing on that process. When ajudge makes a decision, stage-four moral
reasoning accelerates the process of legitimation for that decision
because most members of the interpretive community are more
receptive to stage-four moral reasoning. This result, however, could
easily change if the interpretive community changes. 8 As more
132. See, e.g., Landwehr, supra note 34, at 44-45 (finding that overwhelming majority of
attorneys use stage-four reasoning);June L. Tapp & FeliceJ. Levine, Legal Socalization: Strategies
for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1974) (concluding that law students rarely
reason at levels higher than stage four); Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral
Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 355
(1981) (finding that law students did not move beyond stage four even after course in legal
ethics).
133. Landwehr, supra note 34, at 44-45.
134. Landwehr, supra note 34, at 44-45.
135. Landwehr, supra note 34, at 44-45.
136. Landwehr, supra note 34, at 44.
137. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of stage-four
thinking in legal community).
138. In fact, stage four's current pervasiveness may simply reflect how the process of
persuasion operates in a historically male legal structure. See Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's
Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447,486 (noting that U.S. Constitution "designed a framework for
governing society as it was perceived by men and run by men"). Professor Karst suggests that
constitutional interpretation based on Gilligan's concept ofjustice might produce the following
nonexhaustive list of changes in substantive constitutional law. elimination of the threshold
showing of discriminatory purpose in discrimination suits against the government, renunciation
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women assume greater roles in shaping law and legal education,'
one might expect the interpretive community to respond more
positively to Gilligan's feminine structures of moral reasoning.'
4°
But considering the institutional masculinity of the law for the past
several hundred years," this change will probably occur slowly.
Today, one can still posit that subconsciousjudicial use of fourth-stage
Kohlberg moral reasoning helps legitimize judicial decisions because
that type of moral reasoning is frequently employed by the interpre-
tive community itself.
B. Moral Reasoning and Legal Acceptance
Because many adults and most attorneys employ stage-four legal
reasoning,142 one would expect legal opinions that employ such
reasoning to be accepted readily into the legal fabric that justifies
government coercion. As a corollary, one would expect opinions
based on other types of moral reasoning to be less persuasive and
thus less likely to be accepted quickly into what the interpretive
community designates as the jurisprudential body of "good law." 43
Although the sampling of cases required to verify these hypotheses is
of state action limitations on discrimination, and recognition that some forms of poverty are
stigmatizing and prevent full participation in society. Id. at 493.
139. See Ruth Piller, Women Change the Face of Local Legal Scene; Get Leadership Positions in
Lawyers'Groups, HOUS. CHRON.,July 13, 1992, at A13 (noting shift in gender composition of legal
associations); Rosalind Resnick, Women Take the Bar Group Helm," Gains Continue at State and Local
Leves, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27,1992, at 10, 10 (documenting rapid increase in women's participation
in legal community). In f&ct, President Clinton appointed Janet Reno to the position of
Attorney General of the United States, see David Johnson, Reno Completes Lineup at Justice Dept.,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1993, at B16, and nominated Judge Ruth Bader Ginsberg to the U.S.
Supreme Court,Joan Biskupic,Judge Ruth Ginsberg Named to High Court: Nominee's Philosophy Seen
as Strengthening Center, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at Al. The Senate confirmed Judge
Ginsberg's nomination by a 96-3 vote on August 3, 1993. Judge Ginsberg was sworn in as the
107th Justice of the Supreme Court on August 10. For the proposition that the impact of this
gender shift cannot be measured by numbers alone, see Judith Resnick, On the Bias: Feminist
Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for OurJudges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1913 (1988) (stating that
"[r]ather than simply being men in skirts, women have begun to think that they can still be
women in roles that were, in the past, the sole province of men").
140. Indeed, much of the criticism ofDeShaneyhas come from feministlegalwriters. See e.g.,
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MIcm. L. REv. 2271, 2275 (1990) (arguing
thatJustice Rehnquist's opinion in DeShaney explains and reaffirms conventional thinking about
governmental duty to provide competent services); Minow, supra note 91, at 1667-68 (postulating
that judicial inaction in DeShaney reflects judicial attitude toward family violence that is
improperly based on assumptions that "violence is private" and that "government has to act to
invade someone's rights").
141. See Karst, supra note 138, at 486 (discussing historical dominance of male vision in
jurisprudence).
142. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of stage-four
reasoning).
143. There are, of course, other factors that determine whether an opinion becomes "good
law," including the reaction of the general public to what they hear of the decision and the
changing political and social climate of the country.
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beyond the scope of this Article, the history of a few landmark
decisions indicates that there may be some basis for these conclusions.
Take, for example, Roe v. Wade,1 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed a woman's right to choose to have an abortion.l"
That decision remains today one of the most controversial decisions
in the Court's history."4 It has inspired massive numbers of citizens
to hold marches, demonstrations, and protests to express their
opinions about the decision. 47 Personal views of the Roe decision
sometimes play a role in judicial confirmation hearings. 8 To say
simply that Roe has not yet become a pillar of accepted American
jurisprudence understates the controversial status of the decision.
The Court's reasoning in Roe transcends traditional Kohlberg
fourth-stage moral reasoning.149 In fact, the Court could not rely on
majoritarian practice as a foundation for Roe precisely because, at the
time of the decision, that practice would not have supported its
holding.150 The Court indeed recognized that "[t]he Constitution
144. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
145. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that right to personal privacy includes
right to choose to terminate pregnancy).
146. Until recently, the Supreme Court has consistently chipped away at the impact of Roe
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991) (upholding statutes that prevented publicly
funded health centers from providing abortion counseling); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) (upholding state refusal to allow public employees or public
hospitals to participate in abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309-27 (1980) (upholding
restrictions on use of federal funds to reimburse abortion costs).
147. See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, Going Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1993, at A23 (discussing
demonstrations in years since Roe decision).
148. In his confirmation hearings, for example, then-Judge Clarence Thomas told the Senate
that he had never debated the contents of Roe v. Wad Nomination ofJudge Clarence Thomas to
be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciay,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 222 (1991). Because there seems to be some controversy about
Justice Thomas' remarks, the following exchange bears examination:
Senator Leahy: "Have you ever had a discussion of Roe v. Wade other than in this
room? In the 17 or 18 years it's been there?"
Judge Thomas: "Only, I guess, senator, in the fact that, in the most general sense, that
other individuals express concerns one way or the other, and you listen and you try to
be thoughtful. If you're asking me whether or not I've ever debated the contents of
it, the answer to that is no, senator .... "
Id. Justice Thomas recognized that Roewas an extremely sensitive political issue, and he realized
that taking a strong public stance on the decision might impair both the success of his
nomination and his ability to function as a neutral decisionmaker once he became a Justice.
Mark Tushnet has called Justice Thomas' statement about Roe a "political lie"--a false statement
made to gain political advantage and tolerated because no one takes it seriously. Mark Tushnet,
Colloquy- The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 292 (1992) (noting that
political lies dealing with past events often involve highly charged matters). The point remains,
however, thatJustice Thomas' answer demonstrates just how controversial the Roe decision is.
149. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (describing Kohlberg's fourth-stage moral
reasoning).
150. The New York Times reported that, before Roe, the American public was divided over the
question of whether abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy should be legal. Among
those responding to a Gallup Poll taken before Roewas decided, 46% favored legalizing abortion
MORAL REASONING AND LEGITIMACY
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy."' Moreover, the
Court noted that the majority of states enforced laws severely
restricting abortions, if not banning them entirely.' Many of those
laws had been in effect for over 100 years.13  It would have been
difficult, therefore, for the Court to argue that the laws did not
accurately reflect a fairly established limitation on reproductive
freedom in American society, at least at that time.
Instead, the Court embarked on a search for a universal ethical
principle, one that manifested itself in the organization of other
societies over time and by which the Court could judge and revise the
American social contract. In pursuit of this goal, the Court surveyed
the attitudes of ancient Persians, Greeks, and Romans toward
abortion.154 For example, the Court concluded that "[m]ost Greek
thinkers... commended abortion, at least prior to viability." 55
The Court next turned its attention to the common law as if to test
whether the universal principle condoning some abortions found a
voice in Anglo-Americanjurisprdence. After examining the common
law, the Court concluded that "[i] t is undisputed that at common law,
abortion performed before 'quickening'-the first recognizable
movement of the fetus in utero . . .- was not an indictable of-
fense."'56 This general acceptance of some abortions, according to
the Court, stemmed from the adoption of philosophical and
theological concepts of when life begins rather than from any notion
of majority will.'57 Before the nineteenth century, the Court noted,
Christian theology took the position that life did not begin until forty
in the first three months; 45% were opposed; and 9% were undecided. Gallup Poll Finds Public
Divided on Abortions in First Three Months, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1973, at 45. In the days after Roe
came out, the Times ran articles both praising and criticizing the decision. Compare Lawrence
Van Gelder, Cardinals Shocked-Reactions Mixed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1973, at 1 (writing that
Catholic church leaders called decision "'shocking' and 'horrifying'") with Editorial, Respect for
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1973, at 40 (hailing decision as reasonable resolution of "a debate
that has divided America"). Moreover, the paper noted that Roe invalidated the laws of 31 states
and required 15 additional states to amend their statutes substantially. Warren Weaver Jr.,
National Guidelines Set by 7-to-2 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1973, at 1, 20.
151. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
152. Id. at 129.
153. See, e.g., 1860 Conn. Pub. Acts 65 (criminalizing abortions before quickening) (cited in
Roe, 410 U.S. at 138 n.30); 4 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 4, ch. I, tit. 2 at 661, & tit. 6, at 694 (1829)
(imposing criminal penalties for both quickened and unquickened fetuses) (cited in Roe, 410
U.S. at 138 n.31); see also James A. Knecht, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on
Abortion: The Contradictions and the Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L REV. 177, 178 (surveying abortion
laws and their origins just before Roe took effect and noting that although abortion laws
remained static for centuries, they changed profoundly beginning in 1967).
154. Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-32.
155. Id. at 131 (citing Plato and Aristotle).
156. Id. at 132.
157. Id. at 133.
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days after conception for males and eighty days after conception for
females."' The Court then surveyed English law in an attempt to
demonstrate that the English generally held fast to the basic principle
that women could obtain abortions before the fetus became via-
ble.
159
Finally, the Court confirmed that the universal principle it sought,
one 'that recognized a limited right to an abortion, found some voice
within American society." The Court expressly noted the views of
the American Medical Association, the American Public Health
Association, and the American Bar Association, all of which urged that
abortions be made available to women on a limited basis.
161
Having found its universal ethical principle, the Court then sought
to make that principle part of the social contract governing American
society. Thus, it concluded that the Constitution's implied right of
privacy casts a "penumbra" large enough to accommodate the limited
right to obtain an abortion.'62 Significantly, the Court did not
argue that the right of privacy created a woman's right to decide to
terminate a pregnancy; rather, it concluded that the "right of privacy
. . . is broad enough to encompass" that decision.'63 The limited
right to an abortion, a universal principle, stemmed, therefore, not
from the majoritarian social contract, as it would in fourth-stage moral
reasoning. Instead, employing classic fifth-stage moral reasoning,l6
the Court found that such a right preceded the social contract.
Under this line of reasoning, the Court felt obligated to expand the
social contract to include this preexisting right.
After employing fifth-stage Kohlberg moral reasoning, the Court, in
delineating the scope of a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy,
balanced interests in a way that closely resembled Gilligan's third
stage of moral reasoning; 6 ' the Court meticulously defined the
concerns of the mother, the fetus, and the state in this dilemma."
158. See id. at 133 n.22, 134 (stating that writings of St. Augustine reflected theological
debate).
159. Id. at 185-37.
160. Id. at 140-41.
161. Id. at 141-47.
162. Id. at 152-53; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating for first
time that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance").
163. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
164. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (explaining Kohlberg's fifth-stage moral
reasoning).
165. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (describing Giligan's third stage of moral
reasoning as stage in which woman rejects logic of pure self-sacrifice and begins to include own
needs within concept of care).
166. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
[Vol. 43:49
MORAL REASONING AND LEGMACY
The Court noted that "[m] aternity, or additional offspring, may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future" and that
"[pisychological harm may be imminent."167 At the same time, the
Court pointed out that the state may "properly assert important
interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards,
and in protecting potential life."1" Finally, the Court noted that
citizens may be swayed by varying philosophical concepts of life that
may alter each individual's perception of the problem. 69
It is thus clear that in creating the trimester framework, Roe sought
a balance between the state's interests and the mother's interests.
The Court turned its attention not to abstract rights and principles,
but to the individual needs and concerns of the actors. It recognized
the connection and the conflict between the interests of the state and
those of the mother, and, like some of Gilligan's own subjects, 7' it
sought to minimize that conflict by giving effect, as much as possible,
to the needs of each actor.
Although Roe might encompass more than one type of moral
reasoning, this fact does not necessarily disprove the hypotheses of
this Article. In fact, one might expect opinions that are the result of
analysis by a coalition of judges to reflect different types of moral
reasoning. Each judge may view the case in a different framework,
and each may want to voice different concerns. Despite the variety of
viewpoints that might have been incorporated in the Roe opinion, it
is clear that Roe did not employ Kohlberg's fourth-stage moral
reasoning. The absence of that reasoning might, at least partially,
explain why Roe has had difficulty gaining acceptance within the
interpretive community."'
167. Id.
168. Id. at 154.
169. Id. at 160 (stating that "[ilt should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of
thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question").
170. See GnuGAN, supra note 53, at 73 (discussing struggle of Gilligan's subjects to reconcile
personal needs with desire not to hurt others).
171. Again, many other factors may also explain why Roe remains controversial, including the
religious undertones to the debate over when life begins and the long history of controversy
surrounding abortion policy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (noting religious aspects of debate); see
also supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing controversy surrounding legalization
of abortion). Professor Anita Allen suggests that the right to privacy may be unpopular for two
basic reasons. Anita L. Allen, Autonomy's Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation,
72 B.U. L. REV. 683, 694 (1992). First, it protects or could be used to protect unpopular and
often controversial behavior. Id. Second, the right conflicts with the "backward-looking
positivist ground [s]" in that the right is not "textually based or enumerated" and is "undemocrat-
ic." Id. Professor Allen's argument is consistent with this Article's hypothesis that Roe relies on
fifth-stage moral reasoning rather than fourth-stage reasoning, which would place greater
emphasis on text and majoritarian principles.
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Interestingly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Case' 72 upholds and attempts to legitimize the Roe
framework by employing fourth-stage Kohlberg moral reasoning. In
Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe, thereby indicating that some
privacy right to an abortion still exists.173  Nonetheless, the Court
rejected the constitutional basis of Roe's trimester framework and
indicated that statutes limiting abortions would be valid unless they
imposed an undue burden on a woman's liberty interest 1 74
Casey obviously restricts the right to an abortion accorded women
under Roes trimester framework.' Because the Court did not
overrule Roe, however, it again had to explain the source of a woman's
right to terminate a pregnancy.76 Instead of reiterating Roe's
conclusion that the due process right of privacy was broad enough to
encompass a preexisting universal principle guaranteeing a woman's
limited freedom to terminate a pregnancy, 77 the Court in Casey
reversed that reasoning. It held that the Fourteenth Amendment was
the source of the rights Roe granted. 7 8  The Court stated that
"[c] onstitutional protection of the woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 79  By making the Constitution, an accepted social
contract, the source of the right, the Court thereby invoked the
fourth-stage concept that rights and principles flow not from
independent preexisting ethical principles, but rather from a social
contract based on majority will. 80
172. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
173. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (stating that '[f]rom
what we have said so far it follows that it is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some
freedom to terminate her pregnancy").
174. Id. at 2818-20. According to the Court, Roe's trimester framework "undervalues the
State's interest in the potential life within the woman." Id. at 2820. Thus, "the undue burden
standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's
constitutionally protected liberty." Id.
175. See id. (placing greater emphasis on state's interests in life of unborn child than did
Court in Roe). There is no question that this holding limits the privacy right accorded women
under Roe's trimester framework. Because the Court explicitly endorsed that privacy right,
however, it could not simply overrule Roe.
176. See id. at 2816 (discussing constitutional origins of woman's right to terminate
pregnancy).
177. See Roe 410 U.S. at 154 (concluding that right to decide to have abortion, though not
unlimited, does fall within right to privacy).
178. Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2804.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (describing Kohlberg's fourth-stage of
moral reasoning). To conclude its opinion, the Court stated, "Our Constitution is a covenant
running from the first generation of Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a
coherent succession.... We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full
meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2833. This
statement crystallizes the idea of a social contract that produces rights and values.
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Continuing with its fourth-stage moral reasoning analysis, the Court
provided further support for Roe by relying on precedent and on the
Court's own mandate within the constitutional framework to justify
upholding its decision in Roe.18 The Court stated that decisions
granting couples the right to use contraception, decisions the majority
accepted as part of the current social contract, lend support to
Roa 82 The Court also argued that Roe had gained precedential
value in its own right and concluded that it too had become part of
the existing social contract, supported, if not created, by majority
will. "'83 According to the Court, "An entire generation has come of
age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of
women to act in society, and to make reproductive decisions..
. ."' The Court in Casey thus revived a fairly static vision of law
and values to strengthen Roe, a vision that mirrors the static concept
of morality in Kohlberg's fourth stage.
Finally, the Court turned to its own role within the constitutional
framework, a role premised not on universal ethical principles, but
rather on, as the Court stated, "the people's acceptance of the
Judiciary."'85 Here, the Court echoed a fundamental tenet of
fourth-stage morality, that law and order must be preserved as a moral
good in its own right.'86 The Court concluded that the need to
preserve its own legitimacy within the constitutional framework
prohibited a reversal of Roe, not so much because the Court was
inherently just, but because the "rule of law" is intrinsically worthy of
preservation.187  "If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined,
then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through
its constitutional ideals. "188
181. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (noting that Court must exercise its traditional capacity in
adjudicating substantive due process claims). Professor Anita Allen characterized the decision
as "a paradigm of neutral principalism, upward-looking to right reason, but justified by appeal
to the backward-looking norm of legal tradition .... " Allen, supra note 171, at 695.
182. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (holding that abortion decision is afforded same constitutional
protection as decision to use contraception); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 685 (1977) (finding that regulations on distribution of nonprescription contraceptives must
be narrowly drawn to prevent burdening right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (declaring that right of privacy concerning use of contraceptives extends to both married
and unmarried individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (stating that
statute prohibiting use of contraception by married couples is unconstitutional).
183. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808 (noting that obligation to follow precedent begins with
necessity).
184. Id. at 2812.
185. Id. at 2814.
186. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (describing Kohlberg's fourth stage of
moral reasoning as "law and order' stage in which individual identifies primarily with need to
preserve whole sociomoral system).
187. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2815-16.
188. Id. at 2816.
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It is too early to discern whether Casey, by resorting to fourth-stage
moral reasoning, will speed the acceptance of the Roe decision within
society. Although the abortion controversy may cool in the next
several years, one suspects that it will not die entirely. Still, the
structure of Casey lends strong support to the thesis of this Article. In
an effort to place Roe on firm legal ground, the Supreme Court
abandoned the moral structure of the initial decision and reverted to
fourth-stage Kohlberg moral reasoning. 8 9
C. Criminal Law Jurisprudence
In an effort to prove that Roe is not an isolated case study, this
Article now turns to a few landmark decisions in criminal law. Gideon
v. Wainwright'° is perhaps a good example of a landmark decision
that has gained widespread acceptance within the American legal
community. Despite the fact that few states historically provided
counsel for indigent defendants,' the Supreme Court in Gideon
concluded that the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused
receive the effective assistance of counsel applied in prosecutions for
state crimes as well as those for federal crimes.9 ' In reaching that
result, the Court in Gideon overturned its prior ruling in Betts v.
Brady,'8 but it did so by relying on typical fourth-stage Kohlberg
moral reasoning.'94
The Court first looked to the text of the Constitution as the source
of the fundamental rights and principles at issue in the case.'9 5 It
noted that the Sixth Amendment requires that "'[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'"'96 The Court also stated
that the Fourteenth Amendment creates the authority to apply
189. See supra notes 144-69 and accompanying text (discussing reliance by Court in Roe on
preexisting right to abortion).
190. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
191. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRumPET 107-110 (1964) (discussing historical reasons
behind decision of most states not to provide counsel for indigent defendants).
192. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (holding that effective assistance of
counsel is fundamental right).
193. 316 U.S. 455, 472 (1942) (asserting that whether due process has been denied in state
court by denying defendant free legal counsel depends on totality of facts), overruled by Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
194. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing importance of social contract
and majority rule in fourth stage).
195. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341 (noting that Bill of Rights provides safeguards for liberty
interests at federal level, while Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
protection from state invasion).
196. Id. at 339 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
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fundamental constitutional rights against the states.17  The initial
authority for Gideon's extension of the right to counsel to state trials
therefore lay in the social contract itself. The Court could rely on
that contract to reach its result; any consideration of fundamental
ethical principles lying outside the contract did not enter into the
decision.
The Court in Gideon, however, still faced one obstacle. Previously,
in Betts, it had specifically held that the right to counsel was not a
fundamental right and, consequently, was not incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment.9 The Court in Gideon surmounted this
obstacle and remained within the framework of fourth-stage moral
reasoning: it simply stated that Betts had misinterpreted the constitu-
tional understanding of fundamental rights.' It noted that prior
decisions, themselves interpretations of the social contract, had
concluded that the right to counsel was a fundamental right."° For
example, the Court cited Grosjean v. American Press Co.,2"1 a 1936
case in which the Court had emphasized the fundamental nature of
the right to counsel." 2 Betts, then, not Gideon, could rightly be
interpreted as an unwarranted deviation from the constant principles
of the Constitution.
Finally, to complete its fourth-stage arguments, the Court recog-
nized the need for procedural uniformity and procedural fairness,
classic fourth-stage concerns,0 3 stating "From the very beginning
our.., laws have laid great emphasis on procedural... safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law.""' The government and
wealthy defendants, it concluded, routinely used lawyers in criminal
trials; therefore, "It]he 'noble ideal' of procedural fairness could not
be realized unless poor defendants received the same opportunity to
use counsel during the criminal process."
20 5
197. Id. at 341 (acknowledging that guarantees protected from federal abridgment by Bill
of Rights are equally protected against state abridgment by Fourteenth Amendment).
198. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 444, 471-72 (1942) (asserting that majority of states have not
considered right to counsel fundamental).
199. Gidem, 372 U.S. at 342 (stating that Court in Betts was wrong in concluding that Sixth
Amendment guarantee of counsel is not fundamental).
200. Id. at 342-44 (citing cases that held right to counsel fundamental).
201. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
202. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936) (asserting that right to
counsel in criminal proceeding is fundamental right that is protected against federal and state
encroachment).
203. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (characterizing Kohlberg's fourth stage of
moral reasoning as concern for preservation of social contract).
204. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
205. Id.
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The Court in Gideon thus employed fourth-stage moral reasoning to
reach its result. It derived its authority not from universal ethical
principles that precede any social contract, but rather from the
language of the Constitution, the existing social contract that
presumably enjoys the support of the majority of Americans.2'
Likewise, the Court created an image of law as consistent and
unchanging, and it espoused classic fourth-stage concerns about the
need for procedural uniformity.0 7
In contrast to Gideon, Weeks v. United State? 8 has continued to be
the center of a storm of legal controversy.209 In Weeks, the Supreme
Court ruled that evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of
the Fourth Amendment could not be used against a defendant in
federal criminal proceedings.210  After a few false starts, 211 the
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohi 2t 2 extended the exclusionary rule
in Weeks to state court proceedings and implied that the rule would
have broad effect as a necessary method of protecting Fourth
Amendment rights.2 3 Although Weeks and its progeny, like Mapp
v. Ohio, still survive today, the Court has limited their effect and has
attempted to narrow the principles on which they rest.2 14 In
206. See id. at 341-45 (describing constitutional justifications for decision).
207. See id. at 344 (discussing importance of precedent).
208. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
209. See, e.g.,Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department ofJustice's Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 395, 395 n.3 (1989) (stating that exclusionary rule 'helped to precipitate the now
dominant public perception . . . that the criminal justice system releases defendants on
'technicalities,' ... and converted search and seizure law into an arcane subject. . . ."); Office
of Legal Polity, Report to the Attorney General on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 575,581 (1989) (recommending "a program of legislative, litigative, and administrative
initiatives to abolish the exclusionary rule").
210. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
211. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 642
(1961), the Court initially concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply to state court
proceedings. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), however, signaled a change in
direction. There, the Court overruled the "silver platter" doctrine by holding that evidence
obtained illegally by state agents could not be used in federal criminal trials. Id. at 223-24.
212. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
213. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961).
214. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990) (holding that exclusionary rule does not
prevent state from using defendant's statement made outside home after defendant was illegally
arrested inside home, if police have probable cause); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922
(1984) (holding that exclusionary rule does not apply if officers acted in good faith). In fact,
at various times, certain Justices have sought to limit the scope of the rule. Se, e.g., Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that exclusionary rule should
be modified to permit introduction of evidence obtained in good faith); California v. Minajares,
443 U.S. 916, 917 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (advocating grant of certiorari to allow
reevaluation of exclusionary rule); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, CJ.,
concurring) (asserting that exclusionary rule should be modified and retained for only limited
category of cases); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262-71 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting costs to society of collateral attack based on claim of illegally secured
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addition, scores of legal commentators have explored alternatives to
the exclusionary rule.215  Thus the rule can hardly be said, even
after all these years, to be firmly established as "good law." In United
States v. Leon,"6 for example, the Court ruled that the exclusionary
rule did not apply when police officers acted in good-faith reliance on
a warrant that later turned out to be defective.217  Likewise, in
United States v. Janis,218 the Court announced that the exclusionary
rule did not bar the introduction in tax court proceedings of evidence
illegally seized by state officers acting in good faith.219
Interestingly, Weeks employed Kohlberg's fifth stage of legal
reasoning.2 ' The Court did not ground the exclusionary rule in
the Fourth Amendment itself. Instead, it noted that the rule was part
of the fundamental concept of rights and protections, or universal
ethical principles, that the Fourth Amendment sought to embody.
The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule was part of a
"principle . . . enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth
Amendment."222  That fundamental principle, which the Court
characterized as "[t]he maxim that 'every man's house is his castle,"'
evidence).
215. These alternatives include increased use of police review boards, subjecting police to
criminal penalties in extreme circumstances, and instituting civil suits for damages against the
government. See Offie of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney Genera4 supra note 209, at 579-80
(arguing that no other common law country has adopted American-style exclusionary rule and
discussing alternative criminal and administrative sanctions); see also Yale Kamisar, Does, (Did)
(Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a Principled Basis"Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16
CREIGHTON L REv. 565, 618-21 (1983) (finding that although alternatives exist, exclusionary rule
is best able to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures); William A. Schroeder, Deterring
Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. LJ. 1361, 1385-1412
(1981) (exploring civil damages actions, criminal penalties, nonjudicial external controls,
internal controls, injunctions, and warrants as possible alternatives to exclusionary rule).
Some of the proposals for alternative remedies for Fourth Amendment violations are quite
old. See Virgil W. Peterson, Restrictions in the Law ofSearch and Seizure, 52 Nw. U. L REv. 46, 62
(1957) (noting that preservation of rights guaranteed by Fourth Amendment should be
accomplished through direct action, not indirectly through rule of evidence); William T. Plumb,
Jr., Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L. REv. 337, 386-88 (1939) (examining direct
remedies to prevent and punish illegal law enforcement). For an argument that any alternative
to the exclusionary rule would provide insufficient Fourth Amendment protection, see Yale
Kamisar, Remembering the 'Old World" of Ciminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH.
J.L REF. 537, 560-68 (1990) [hereinafter Kamisar, "Old Worldl.
216. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
217. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (finding that marginal benefits
produced by suppression of evidence obtained in reliance on subsequently invalidated search
warrant were outweighed by costs of exclusion).
218. 428 U.S. 433 (1975).
219. United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1975).
220. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (describing characteristics of Kohlberg's
fifth stage of moral reasoning).
221. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391 (stating that Fourth Amendment was meant to perpetuate
principles of humanity and civil liberty).
222. Id. at 390.
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existed before and outside the social contract found in the Constitu-
tion.2 3 The Court determined that because the Constitution simply
embodied this fundamental principle, the Fourth Amendment was
broad enough to encompass all of that principle, including the
exclusionary rule.224 "The efforts of the court . . . to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles... which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 225
The problem with Weeks, however, is that the exclusionary rule itself
offends other values inherent in fourth-stage moral reasoning. By
excluding potentially incriminating evidence, the rule allows some
guilty defendants to escape conviction. 226  Consequently, the rule
seems to create an almost arbitrary exception to the law-an
exception that, in some circumstances, may frustrate the very purpose
of the law. For example, two defendants might have committed the
same crime. If the police conducted a lawful search in the first case
and an unlawful search in the second, the first defendant might be
convicted while the second defendant might go free.22 '7 Because the
exclusionary rule itself seems to undermine substantive uniformity in
the law by allowing some guilty persons to go free, this result may
provide a basis for a fourth-stage argument for the elimination of the
rule.228
More recent Supreme Court opinions limiting the scope of the
exclusionary rule have, to a certain extent, adopted this argument and
transformed the rule from one that rests on fundamental universal
principles to one that ensures that the government adheres to a
fourth-stage-type social contract32 In United States v. Calandra, 2
for example, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in
grand jury proceedings.23 1 The Court noted that the rule was not
223. Id.
224. Id. at 390-93.
225. Id. at 393.
226. See Grano, supra note 209, at 395-96 n.3 (criticizing rule for impeding criminal justice
system's truthfinding process). But see Kamisar, "Old World "supra note 215, at 542-44 (arguing
that truth is not only goal of criminal process).
227. SeeJanis, 428 U.S. at 448-54 (discussing social costs of exclusionary rule).
228. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (describing importance of uniform
application of laws to fourth-stage moral reasoning).
229. See Kamisar, "Old World, " supra note 215, at 560-61 (recognizing that exclusionary rule
was originally based on "principled basis" of avoiding judicial ratification of police misconduct
rather than empirical need to deter law enforcement misbehavior upon which rule now rests).
230. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
231. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (finding that questions based on
illegally obtained evidence constitute derivative use of product of past unlawful search and
seizure rather than new Fourth Amendment wrong).
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mandated either by fundamental principle or by the Constitution
itself, 2 rather, the rule was merely a "judicially created remedy"
designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights.33  Furthermore, the
rule was not, as implied in Weeks, necessary to protect an individual's
constitutional rights:' "The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not
to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim."235 Instead,
the Court viewed the rule simply as a deterrent to future government
abuse of constitutional rights.236 The Court, therefore, centered the
rule's validity simply on the rule's prophylactic ability to ensure future
government compliance with the social contract expressed in the
Constitution.3 7
Having thus sprung the exclusionary rule free from its foundation
in fifth-stage moral reasoning, 8 the Court has been able to pick the
situations in which it will give effect to the principle of deter-
rence. 239  In Leon, for example, the Court refused to apply the
exclusionary rule where the police relied, in good faith, on a warrant
that later turned out to be deficient.2 ' °  In so doing, the Court
determined that application of the rule would not further the
principle of deterrence. 24' Using coherent fourth-stage moral
reasoning, the Court concluded that the rule could not possibly
encourage the government to live up to the "bargain," namely, the
Constitution, when government officers acting in good faith had
already made every effort to do so.2 2 This coherent fourth-stage
reasoning perhaps helped justify the Court's attack on the
exclusionary rule.
232. Id. at 348 (stating that rule is not "a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved").
233. Id.
234. Id. at 354 (noting that use of illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings does
not violate defendant's constitutional rights).
235. Id. at 347.
236. Id.
237. See id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), for proposition that
exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter future breaches of "constitutional guaranty. .. ").
238. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text (explaining that analysis in Weeks is rooted
in Kohlberg's fifth stage of moral reasoning).
239. At least one study has actually indicated that the exclusionary rule is not an effective
deterrent to police misconduct. See William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 311, 358-59 (1991) (determining that data make clear that exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence offers only weak deterrent to police). Heffernan and Lovely also argue that Leon's
good faith exception discourages rigorous training of the police in Fourth Amendment law. Id.
at 368.
240. Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
241. Id. at 916-17 (noting that there was no basis to believe that exclusionary rule deterred
judges or magistrates from issuing deficient warrants).
242. See id. at 916-18 (noting importance of good faith in Court's determination of scope of
exclusionary rule).
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The reason for discussing these cases is simply to demonstrate that
the Court initially grounded its application of the exclusionary rule on
fifth-stage Kohlberg reasoning.2' Because the rule itself produced
results that conflicted with other fourth-stage values, such as the need
for uniformity of results and procedural fairness, 4 the rule may
have been vulnerable to attack. In later decisions limiting the rule,
the Court used fourth-stage moral reasoning in an attempt to limit its
application.2' In so doing, the Court may have increased the
legitimacy of its attack, thus increasing the likelihood that the legal
community would accept limitations on the rule.
CONCLUSION
Law is a violent business. Every decision masks a deed, and those
deeds are ultimately coercive. At its best, law is about imposing
shared values and norms on society for the benefit of its members.
At its worst, it is simple tyranny. Law, however, is always coercive.
One way law may legitimize its violence is through the adoption of
a fabric of morality. Law may not ordain particular moral choices in
all circumstances, but it certainly employs moral reasoning in its quest
for legitimacy. When judges speak, they often do so in ways that
mirror the moral systems delineated by Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol
Gilligan. Which moral system ajudge employs usually shapes the way
that judge will explain his or her decision. Each moral system gives
weight to different societal concerns; each approaches the world in a
different way. Thus, each shapes and confines the text of a judicial
opinion. Judges who employ Kohlberg's masculine moral reasoning
may give little weight in their opinions to the connections and
responsibilities inherent in societal relationships. Judges who adopt
Gilligan's feminine moral reasoning may tinge the masculine fabric
of law's abstract rights with a concrete concern for caring, for
"alleviating the real and recognizable trouble of the world."2'
What, then, is the effect of the use of different moral systems? If
one views law's quest for legitimacy as a process of interaction
between those who make the law, those who interpret it, and those
who live under it, then the dialogue between judges and the
243. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text (describing Court's reliance on fifth-stage
moral reasoning).
244. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text (noting that Weeks offends fourth-stage
moral reasoning).
245. See supra notes 229-42 and accompanying text (describing Court's attempt to limit
exclusionary rule).
246. GILLIGAN, supra note 53, at 100; see also supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text
(discussing DeShaney dissent's use of Gilligan's moral reasoning).
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interpretive community can aid in the creation of that legitimacy.
Judges need to persuade lawyers, legislators, other judges, and even
the public at times that they have reached the right result. Moral
reasoning may provide judges with a tool to aid in that persuasion.
In fact, some types of moral reasoning may be more persuasive than
others. Given the composition of the current interpretive community
and the inherently masculine fabric of the law, this Article argues that
Kohlbergian fourth-stage moral reasoning may aid judges in their task
of persuasion more successfully than other types of moral reasoning.
Although a much more scientific sampling of cases is necessary to
prove this hypothesis, a close reading of a few landmark decisions
seems to support this view. Decisions that employ Kohlberg's fourth
stage of moral reasoning may, in fact, gain wider acceptance than
decisions using fifth-stage reasoning or Gilligan's moral reasoning.
At this point, one must be careful of overstating the hypothesis.
Clearly, the type of moral reasoning ajudge uses in an opinion is not
the only factor that may affect the legitimacy of that opinion. Other
rhetorical tools of persuasion, changes in the values and needs of
society, changes in the ways we perceive each other, and even
advances in science or technology, to namejust a few factors, may also
affect the legitimacy of law. Brown v. Board of Education, 47 for
example, may be part of today's legal canon not because it used a
certain type of moral reasoning, but because our assumptions about
race and society have changed fundamentally.248 The argument
advanced here is not that moral reasoning always governs legal
legitimacy. It is simply that moral reasoning may be a factor in
creating that legitimacy.
Moreover, this Article advances a descriptive, not a normative, view
of the interaction between moral reasoning and the legitimacy of
judicial opinions. As more women enter the legal profession and
assume positions of power, as the composition of the interpretive
community changes, it is quite possible that other types of moral
reasoning may become increasingly persuasive.2 49 Nonetheless, the
247. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
248. This statement should not be read to suggest that the United States has now achieved
racial equality. The only point here is that moral reasoning is not the only factor that may affect
the ultimate legitimacy of ajudicial opinion. Certainly, many would argue that Brown itself did
not go far enough. See Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board
of Education?, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1867, 1883-85 (1991) (noting that some scholars now argue
that Brown decision was too cautious).
249. Opinions such as Roe or Wweks that do not employ fourth-stage moral reasoning are not
necessarily bad decisions. Any legal system that does not ultimately make some attempt to
evaluate itself against universal ethical principles may eventually be incapable of responding to
the changing needs of society. A system that cannot respond to those needs over a long period
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contrast between Roe and Casey and between Gideon and Weeks
provides at least anecdotal evidence of the interaction between moral
reasoning and legitimacy within the interpretive community. Our
canon today appears to be based on fourth-stage moral reasoning.2
0
Such a state of affairs may not be surprising considering our system's
majoritarian structure and the institutional fabric of the law. It does
provide insight, however, into the value of various types of arguments
judges may marshall to persuade the rest of us that they exercise their
power in a just and moral manner.
of time may lose legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. What Roe and Weeks do point out,
however, is that fourth-stage moral reasoning, at least at this time, may initially be a more
persuasive tool in the judicial quest for legitimacy than other types of moral reasoning.
250. Seesupranotes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing preponderance offourth-stage
moral reasoning in legal community).
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